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cision in the instant case may possibly herald a new era in state
taxation, the state being permitted to burden interstate commerce
more freely in satisfaction of its economic needs.1"
K. W., JR.

TAXATioN-PRoPERY TAX-CHATTELS REAL NOT TAxA.BLE AS
PERSONALTY WITBIN CLAss I.-An assessor listed for property tax
a leasehold of real estate within a municipality under Class IV of
the statute.1 The lessee claimed that the circuit court's ruling upholding the assessor was erroneous. Held, that less than freehold
leaseholds of realty within municipalities are intangible personal
property under Class IV rather than Class I and will be taxed
accordingly. Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin,Assessor.2
Whether "chattels real" should be-assessed under Class I or
Class IV depends upon the interpretation of the statute and the
tax limitation amendment' upon which it is based. Class I, under
the statute, consists, inter alia, of "all money and all notes, bonds,
commission owing to the ruling in the instant decision that penalties and inter-

est be deducted.

12 This sentiment is voiced clearly in the dissents of Mr. Justice Black in T.
D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, and Gwin, Nhite & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,
both supra n. 5.

1W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 8, § 5:
"For the purpose of levies, ....
property shall be classified as follows:
"Class I. All tangible personal property employed exclusively in agriculture, including horticulture and grazing;
"All products of agriculture (including livestock) while owned by the producer;
"All money and all notes, bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and
any other intangible personal property;
"Class II. All property owned, used and occupied by the owner exclusively
for residential purposes;
"All farms, including land used for horticulture and grazing, occupied and
cultivated by their owners or bona fide tenants;
"Class III. All real and personal property situated outside of municipalities,
exclusive of classes I and II.
"Class IV. All real and personal property situated inside of municipalities,
exclusive of classes I and I."
2 10 S. E. (2d) 901 (W. Va. 1940).
a W. VA. CbNsT. art. X, § 1, as amended in 1932. The part of the section
applicable to this comment is as follows: "N one species of property from
which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of
property of equal value; except that the aggregate of taxes assessed in any one
year upon personal property employed exclusively in agriculture, including
horticulture and grazing, products of agriculture as above defined, including live
stock, while owned by the producer, and money, notes, bonds, bills and accounts
receivable, stocks and other similar intangible personal property shall not exceed
fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of value thereon and upon all property
owned, used and occupied by the owner thereof exclusively for residential purposes and upon farms occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona fide
tenants one dollar; and upon all other property situated outside of municipal-
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bills and accounts receivable, stocks, and any other intangible personal property."A If read alone, these italicized words would seem
to conclusively indicate that leaseholds should fall in Class I; but
the interpretation of any statute should be as a whole.5 Class IV,
in the latter part of the same statute, includes all personal property
situated inside of municipalities6 exclusive of that in Classes I and
IIJ and, as another section s of the chapter expressly includes chattels' real in the definition of the term "personal property", our
conclusion necessarily is that Class IV, as well as Class I, could
embrace chattels real
However, by invoking the rule of ejusdem generis, the court
held that the phrase, "any other intangible personal property", as
used in Class I, was limited to other evidences of debt similar to
those named, reasoning that the legislative intent was to follow the
tax limitation amendment upon which the statute was based and
that the limiting word "similar" as contained in the amendment
was inadvertently omitted.
The purpose behind classification of personal property is here
important.10 Intangibles, such as evidences of debt, must be assessed and taxed at a low rate to prevent the taxation from becoming confiscatory of the small income usually realized from the
ownership. Moreover, if the tax is too high, many owners will succumb to the temptation of concealing such valuables. Chattels real,
however, are not so elusive as chattels personal of an intangible
nature, as their existence can be readily ascertained, for these must
necessarily remain connected with the land; also, a higher rate of
taxation would hardly be confiscatory, as the owner is not usually
limited to a certain small return on his investment. Furthermore,
ities, one dollar and fifty cents; and upon all other such property situated within municipalities, two dollars;

...

4 Italics supplied.
5 State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 321, 58 S. E. 715 (1907); Coal & Coke R.
R. v. Conley and Avis, 67 W. Va. 129, 178, 67 S. E. 613 (1910).
6 Classes III and IV are identical except that the former consists of property
outside of municipalities while the latter deals with property inside of
municipalities.
r The leasehold in this case could not fall under Class II for this class is
composed of farms and property owned and used for residential purposes.
8 . VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 5, § 3.
9 1The 'ejusdem generis' rule is that, where the general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning
such words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are held as applying only to persons and things of the same general hind or class as those
specifically mentioned." BLAcK's LAw DiemoNARY (1933) 645.
10 The cause which moved the legislature in the enactment of the statute
should always be considered in the construction of it. Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 37
W. Va. 847, 850, 17 S. E. 409 (1893). It follows that this same principle should
be applicable in the interpretation of constitutional provisions.
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in some parts of the state, the reversion (where the land is subject
to a lease) is of little value, and the tax burden, light as some may
think it to be, is the cause of forfeiture to the state for the nonentry
1
or nonpayment of taxes. Since the Black Band ease," the state
takes merely the forfeited owner's interest if the leasehold has been
assessed and the taxes paid by the lessee, leaving the outstanding
lease as the only interest of real value. The state might thus
gradually became the owner of much nonsalable land from which
the value was being consumed; and the lessee would not bear his
proportional share of the tax burden if his lease were assessed as
personalty under Class I. Hence, with an ever-increasing need for
more revenue for governmental operation,' 2 the situation as to leaseholds might have become embarrassing. The decision in this ease
3
may have been jactuated by the pressure of actual exigency.'
In its implication that mineral leases, as well as ordinary leases,
will not be placed under Class I, the present ease rivals the Black
Band case in importance. A much needed source of greater
revenue is obtained by judicial interpretation"l eliminating the need
of legislation (or even constitutional amendment) giving the same
result. However, the decision does bring to the foreground an
obvious necessity for the establishment of adequate means whereby
leaseholds may be fairly evaluated and assessed.' 6
L. E. T., H.
W. Va. 872, 169 S. E. 614 (1933).
1291The rapid growth of both state and local expenditures, not only in West
Virginia, but in every state in the union, is a matter of common knowledge."
11 State v. Black Band Coal Co., 113

BLxY, REPoaT oN TAxATioN iN WEST VmanumA (1930) 50.

'is "The doctrine of a case is a general proposition of law from which, taken
with the circumstances of the case, the decision logically follows and upon which,
whether expressed in the opinion or not, the court bases its decision." WAMBAUGH, STUDY OP CASES (1894) 29.

14 "The legislature must impose the tax, :6x the rate and subject of taxation,
the mode of assessment and collection. This it must do by general laws, but,
in a proper case, it is as much the duty and as much within the judicial power of
the courts to expound and apply these general laws as it is within the legislative
power to make them." State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80,96,24 S. .
688 (1896).
15 The only lessee's interest in various counties in West Virginia upon which
there is placed a tax is that of the oil and gas lessee, who is assessed according
to production. Assessors have asserted as the reason for not taxing other
lessees the fact that there is no efficient method by which the value of the
leaseholds may be determined.
16 Permanent records showing that the lessee's interest has been assessed and
the taxes paid should be available so that the lessee can easily establish these
facts and thus protect his interest under the doctrine of the Black Band case-if the reversion be forfeited to the state for the nonentry or nonpayment of
taxes. Under the present setup, the fact of payment is sometimes difficult to
prove, because personal property tax returns are not always made a matter of
permanent record.
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